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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT CASES
IN MARYLAND
James F. McCaddent
The author discusses the Maryland law governing the
recovery of punitive damages in tort actions. Centering on
the recent court of appeals decisions in H & R Block, Inc. v.
Testerman and Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., the author
analyzes the distinction between actions for torts arising out
of contracts and pure actions for torts, and concludes that
the standards articulated in Testerman and Wedeman are
those applicable to all punitive damages awards in
Maryland cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Maryland Court of Appeals has given some
structure to the law governing the recovery of punitive damages in
tort actions in this state. In H & R Block v. Testerman,' Judge
Levine, writing for a unanimous court, articulated for the first time a
distinction between pure actions for torts and actions for torts
arising out of contracts, 2 holding that in cases of the latter type,
actual malice must be shown before punitive damages will be
awarded. 3 Two years later, in Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co.,4 the
court, again speaking unanimously through Judge Levine, declined
to apply the Testerman rule to an action for fraud inducing the
plaintiff to contract, holding that in such an instance, implied
malice is sufficient to support an award for punitive damages.5
Although the court maintained in both the Testerman6 and
Wedeman 7 opinions that these decisions do not represent changes in
t A.A., Essex Community College, 1964, magna cum laude; LL.B., University of
Baltimore School of Law, 1969; Partner, Walker and McCadden, P.A.
The author gratefully acknowledges 'the assistance of Elizabeth G.
Newcomb, Articles Editor, University of Baltimore Law Review.
1. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
2. Although prior decisions of the court had implicitly recognized this distinction,
see text accompanying notes 83-126 infra, it had never been articulated in terms
of the pure tort-tort out of contract context prior to the Testerman opinion.
3. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 53.
4. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
5. Id. at 532, 366 A.2d at 12.
6. While it is well settled in this state that punitive damages cannot be
awarded in a pure action for breach of contract, such damages are
recoverable in tort actions arising out of contractual relationships. In
such situations, however, actual malice has been required .... This rule
has been followed consistently.
275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 52-53 (citations omitted).
7. Although the court noted in Wedeman that "in no prior decision ... dealing
with actionable fraud have we been met squarely with the question whether
punitive damages had been properly allowed in the trial court," 278 Md. at 530,
366 A.2d at 11, it applied the standard set out in dicta by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Russell v. Stoops, 106 Md. 138, 66 A. 698 (1907). See note 45 infra.
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the substantive law of punitive damages in tort actions in
Maryland s their importance in clarifying prior law should not be
overlooked. These decisions and their progeny 9 provide the
Maryland practitioner for the first time with guidelines as to what
proof of malice is necessary to support an award of punitive
damages in a given tort case.
This article will discuss the Maryland law of punitive damages
in tort in terms of the structure now provided by Testerman and
Wedeman. It will raise some questions left unanswered by the
decisions and suggest possible guidelines for resolution of these
remaining issues.
II. TESTERMAN TORT ARISING OUT OF CONTRACT
A. The Case
In H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,10 the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs.
Testerman, sued H & R Block in an action for negligent preparation
of their income tax returns. In their declaration the Testermans
asked for damages in both tort and contract, alleging that H & R
Block had "negligently, wantonly, maliciously and intentionally"
prepared two years' tax returns incorrectly." After finding for the
plaintiffs on the liability issue, the trial court ruled as a matter of
law that the Testermans were not entitled to punitive damages, since
they had proved that H & R Block was guilty of "simple negligence"
only.' 2 This decision was reversed by the court of special appeals, 3
which held in part that punitive damages were appropriate since
implied malice, sufficient to support such an award, had been
shown.' 4 On certiorari, the court of appeals noted that although the
trial court's compensatory damages award was based on negligence,
it could have been equally well-founded on the Testermans'
alternative contract theory of suit, 5 and consequently the tort
8. Despite the court's contention to this effect in Testerman, see note 6 supra, the
difficulty encountered by the court in attempting to reconcile McClung-Logan
Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961), with other prior
decisions, see text accompanying notes 114-19 infra, indicates that at least
confusion, if not conflict among decisions, existed prior to Testerman.
9. Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976); General
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975); Derby v. Jenkins, 32 Md. App. 386, 363
A.2d 967 (1976); GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
27 Md. App. 172, 340 A.2d 736 (1975).
10. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
11. Id. at 37, 338 A.2d at 49.
12. Id. at 41, 338 A.2d at 54.
13. Testerman v. H & R Block, Inc., 22 Md. App. 320, 324 A.2d 145 (1974).
14. Id. at 350, 324 A.2d at 161.
15. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
204 [Vol. 6
19771 Punitive Damages 205
committed, negligent preparation of the tax returns, arose out of the
contractual relationship. 16 The court stated that Maryland has long
allowed recovery of punitive damages in such situations, but only
when actual malice has been shown. 17 Finding no proof of actual
malice, the court reversed the court of special appeals' decision that
punitive damages were proper.1 8
B. The Historical Perspective
The import of the Testerman distinction between torts arising
out of, and those independent of, contracts is best understood when
placed in the perspective of the historical purpose for damages in
general. Compensation has been called the "central theme"'19 of the
"harmonious symphony of the law of damages. ' 20 Thus, damages in
contract actions have traditionally been aimed at "compensating"
the plaintiff by restoring him to the position he held prior to
formation of the contract, and courts have traditionally refused to
award punitive damages in cases of pure actions for breach of
contract.21 The Maryland courts have consistently followed this
majority rule.22
In tort actions, however, the avowed purpose of permitting
punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, but rather to
punish the defendant in the hopes of deterring future interference
with the rights of other individuals.2 3 This concept of "exemplary"
16. Id. See also text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
17. 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53, (citing Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972);
Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v.
Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied 404 U.S. 857
(1971); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 197 Md. 556, 69 A. 405
(1908)). The court then went on to fit McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226
Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961), and Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533
(1968), within this line of cases, noting that although each of the latter decisions
appears to uphold an award of punitive damages on implied malice only when
the tort arose out of a contract, proof of actual malice was given in each case. 275
Md. at 45-46, 338 A.2d at 53.
18. 275 Md. at 49, 366 A.2d at 55.
19. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 at 275 (1935) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
20. Id.
21. Id. § 81 at 290.
22. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. at 57, 338 A.2d at 47; H & R Block, Inc.
v. Testerman, 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 52; Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267
Md. at 313, 297 A.2d at 760; St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins.
Co., 262 Md. at 236, 278 A.2d at 33.
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 77 at 275. See also H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,
275 Md. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52, (citing Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62
Md. 300, 307 (1884)); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 430, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942),
an action for damages for assault and battery and false imprisonment against a
policeman, where punishment and deterrence were both stressed by the court:
"exemplary or punitive damages are awarded as a punishment for the evil
motive or intent with which the act is done, and as an example, or warning, to
others."
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damages has been widely recognized by courts in England and
throughout the United States. 24 Such damages have traditionally
been awarded when circumstances showing "aggravation" are
present, that is, when intent beyond that necessary to show
commission of the tort itself has been proved. 25 Although Maryland
joins with the vast majority 26 of American jurisdictions in allowing
punitive damages, courts in this state remain reluctant to do so,
refusing to uphold such an award absent a finding of actual
damages, 27 and requiring proof of aggravated intent as an "absolute
prerequisite" to punitive damages. 28 It is the precise definition of this
"aggravated intent" or "malice" that has provoked such confusion
in the law of punitive damages in Maryland.
In defining the aggravated intent necessary to support a
punitive damages award, Maryland courts distinguish between
"actual" malice and its legal equivalent, 29 sometimes known as
"implied" or "inferred" malice.3 0 The definition of "actual" malice
most often quoted by the Maryland Court of Appeals is as follows:
"[a]ctual or express malice may be characterized as the performance
of an unlawful act, intentionally or wantonly, without legal
justification or excuse but with an evil or rancorous motive
influenced by hate; the purpose being to deliberately and wilfully
injure the plaintiff. ' 31 If the "evil or rancorous motive" is omitted
from the above definition, "implied malice" or the legal equivalent of
actual malice is described: "acts [constituting a tort] practiced
24. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 78 at 278-79.
25. Id. Thus, when the defendant has acted in good faith or upon honest mistake,
punitive damages are precluded. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. at 56,
338 A.2d at 47; Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. at 316, 297 A.2d at 761;
Associates Discount Corp. v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 582, 278 A.2d 592, 598 (1971).
26. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 78.
27. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644-46, 291 A.2d 64, 71 (1972); B &
B Refrigeration v. Stander, 263 Md. 577, 582, 284 A.2d 244, 247 (1971); Kneas v.
Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 125, 262 A.2d 518, 521 (1970); Delisi v. Garnett, 257 Md. 4,
9, 261 A.2d 784, 787 (1970).
28. H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. at 42, 338 A.2d at 52. Such proof may be
supplied by circumstantial evidence. Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278
Md. at 520-21, 366 A.2d at 4-5.
29. Even the court of appeals has recognized that the actual and implied malice
distinction has caused confusion:
The difficulty in the Maryland cases arises in regard to factual
situations in which there is no evidence of actual intent to injure or of
actual malice toward the injured person, but in which the defendant's
conduct is of such an extraordinary character as possibly to be the legal
equivalent of such actual intent or actual malice, sometimes described as
"wanton," "reckless disregard of the rights of others," and the like. We
rather agree that in this latter type of situation the language of some of
the Maryland cases needs further interpretation and possible
reconsideration to reach a more clear-cut rule.
Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 71, 257 A.2d 187, 198 (1969) (emphasis in
original).
30. GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 27 Md. App. at
204, 340 A.2d at 755.
31. Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971).
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intentionally, wantonly and without legal justification or excuse
[show] implied malice or the 'legal equivalent' of actual malice. '32
The distinction between actual and implied malice is, then, that in
order to sustain the lesser burden of proof of implied malice, the
plaintiff need only show wanton conduct,33 while proof of actual
malice requires a showing of evil motive.34
The holding in Testerman that actual malice must be shown in
order to support a punitive damages award in cases of torts arising
out of contracts has been justified by the tort-contract nexus 35 and
the historical distinction between the two actions. 36 Although the
plaintiff in Testerman had a choice of contract or tort action, it is
clear that no cause of action would have arisen had it not been for
the preexistence of the contract between the plaintiffs and H & R
Block. 37 It is on this basis that the court later justified its imposition
of the stricter standard of proof of actual malice. 38
III. WEDEMAN: PURE TORT
A. The Case
In Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co.,39 the Maryland Court of
Appeals reversed the court of special appeals' application of the
Testerman holding, and set out further guidelines as to when
punitive damages will be awarded in tort cases brought in Mary-
land.
Wedeman involved an action for fraud brought by the purchaser
of an automobile against the dealer from whom she bought it. The
automobile was a "demonstrator." Prior to the plaintiffs purchase,
the salesman assured her that the car had never been involved in an
accident. This representation was later proved to be untrue. The trial
court judge submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury after
instructing them, over defendant's objection, that either actual
32. GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 27 Md. App. at
204, 340 A.2d at 755.
33. The Maryland Court of Appeals has given the following definition of "wanton
conduct":
We interpret the language of those cases which speak of wanton conduct
or wantonness as being a basis for awarding punitive damages as
referring to such conduct as would carry an implication of malice or as
conduct from which one would draw a necessary inference of malice,
conduct from which one might determine the existence of actual malice.
St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. at 239, 278 A.2d
at 34-35.
34. H & R Block v. Testerman, 275 Md. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52; Siegman v. Equitable
Trust Co., 267 Md. at 314; 297 A.2d at 760.
35. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11; Henderson v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. at 519, 366 A.2d at 4.
36. H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 52-53. See also
MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 77.
37. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11.
38. Id.
39. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
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malice or its legal equivalent would support an award of punitive
damages."' An award of $6,000 punitive damages followed.
The court of special appeals reversed, 4 1 reasoning that since the
fraud was directly related to the purchase of the automobile,
Testerman applied. Because actual malice had not been established,
punitive damages did not lie. 4 2 On certiorari, the court of appeals
held that the court of special appeals had "misconceived Tester-
man."43 The misconception, it said, was in the court of special
appeals' premise that the fraud shown before the trial court was a
tort arising out of a contract. Unlike the torts considered in
Testerman and the cases before it, however, the tort here preceded
the contract; here it was "the tortious conduct which . . . induce[d]
the innocent party to enter into the contractual relationship. ' ' 4 4
Having thus distinguished Testerman, the court went on to
establish the rule applicable to the recovery of punitive damages in a
pure action for fraud. This rule, adopted from dicta in the case of
Russell v. Stoops,4 5 is that in order to recover punitive damages in a
pure action of fraud, the plaintiff may show either actual malice or
its legal equivalent, implied malice. Finding that on the facts before
it this burden had been met, the court remanded the case to the court
of special appeals with instructions to affirm the judgment of the
trial court. 46
B. Applicability of the Wedeman Standard
The importance of the Wedeman decision is twofold: first, it
establishes a clear standard for awarding punitive damages in fraud
cases. Although the court stated that the rule of Russell v. Stoops
had "come to be regarded" 4 7 as the rule applicable to fraud cases in
Maryland, and that the court had "[n]ever... intimated that actual
malice . . . was necessary to recover punitive damages where fraud
is established," 48 it had, nevertheless, not been squarely faced with
the issue prior to Wedeman.49 Further, while the adoption of the
implied malice standard may appear to present a departure from the
40. Id. at 527, 366 A.2d at 9.
41. City Chevrolet Co. v. Wedeman, 30 Md. App. 637, 354 A.2d 185 (1976).
42. Id. at 643, 354 A.2d at 189.
43. 278 Md. at 528, 366 A.2d at 10.
44. Id. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11.
45. 106 Md. 138, 66 A. 698 (1907).
In ordinary cases the recovery of exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages may be allowed where the wrong involves some violation of
duty springing from a relation of trust or confidence, or where the fraud
is gross, or the case presents other extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances clearly indicating malice and wilfullness.
Id. at 143-44, 66 A. at 700.
46. 278 Md. at 533, 366 A.2d at 13.





conservative attitude toward punitive damages evidenced by
Testerman, the Wedeman opinion is equally significant in that it
specifically rejects the notion, suggested by treatise writers, 50 courts
of other jurisdictions,51 and an earlier decision by the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals,5 2 that proof of fraud per se justifies an
award of punitive damages. This notion is based on the premise that
proof of the intent required to support an action for fraud necessarily
provides proof of the malicious intent required to support punitive
damages. 53 The court, however, refused to adopt this reasoning:
"[a]lthough we hold here that actual malice is not required to recover
punitive damages in cases of actionable fraud, we do not retreat
from [our earlier statement] to the effect that such damages will not
be awarded as a matter of course in actions for fraud."5 4
Although the decision thus appears to require a plaintiff suing
for fraud to meet an additional burden of proving at least implied
malice before he can recover punitive damages, it is difficult to
imagine a fact pattern that would support an action for fraud
without providing proof of the implied malice necessary to support
an award of punitive damages.
Secondly, this author believes that the implied malice standard
applied in Wedeman is the proper standard to be met before punitive
damages are awarded in any pure tort action brought in Maryland,
regardless of the tort upon which the action is founded.55 Thus, any
tort action brought in Maryland should be analyzed in terms of
whether the action is a pure tort action, not arising out of a contract,
in which case the implied malice standard espoused in Wedeman
should apply, or whether it is an action arising out of a contract, in
which case the actual malice standard of Testerman should apply.
An analysis of both the historical development of punitive damages
in Maryland and the recent pronouncements of the Maryland courts
of appeal supports this thesis.
Before this author's conclusion may be reached, though, two
preliminary gaps must be closed. First, it is not evident from the two
opinions themselves that together they present the standard
applicable to punitive damages awards in all tort actions. Secondly,
the decisions themselves do not entirely clarify the issue of when
one, rather than the other, applies to a particular fact situation.
50. See, e.g., SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES § 367 (1847).
51. E.g., Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 288 (D.C. 1975).
52. GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 27 Md. App. at
204, 340 A.2d at 755.
53. Id.
54. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. at 532, 366 A.2d at 12-13.
55. The one exception to the general applicability of this thesis is defamation, the
torts of libel and slander, which, because of their potential infringement on first
amendment rights, have been treated differently from other torts in regard to
punitive damages. For an analysis of Maryland law on defamation, see




The court in Testerman stated its holding broadly: "where the
tort is one arising out of a contractual relationship, actual malice is
a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages. ' 56 It is clear from
this language that the key to Testerman applicability is not that a
particular tort is the basis of the action, but rather, that whichever
tort is involved, the tort sued on arose out of a contract. The
Wedeman holding, on the other hand, is stated by the court to apply
to cases of "actionable fraud. ' '5 7 Nevertheless, the implied malice
standard articulated by the court in Wedeman has been applied in
every case in which the court of appeals has been squarely faced
with the issue of whether a trial court properly allowed an award of
punitive damages for an action for pure tort when only implied
malice was shown. 58
Analysis of the Maryland decisions regarding punitive damages
in pure tort cases is made difficult by the plethora of "red herring"
cases in this area. "Red herring" cases are those in which the court
was not directly faced with the decision of whether the lower court
properly awarded punitive damages, either because there was
evidence of actual malice in the case, 59 and thus no necessity to
decide if implied malice would have been sufficient, or because, on
the contrary, no malice of any kind was shown,60 or simply because
the defendant in the case failed to raise a proper objection to the jury
instructions of the lower court.61 When these "red herring" cases are
disregarded, however, it becomes clear that to support an award of
56. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
57. 278 Md. at 532, 366 A.2d at 12.
58. See text accompanying notes 62-81 infra.
59. Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md..43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972). This case involved
an action for invasion of privacy. Although the jury instructions had called for
proof of actual malice, the court of appeals noted that "[tihere were no exceptions
taken by either side to the charge," id. at 52, 288 A.2d at 118, and further, "[tihere
was . . . evidence of outrageous conduct on the part of Summit Loans with
elements of malice, evil and oppression." Id. Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v.
Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971). In an action for assault and battery,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the appellant claimed "that...
the jury instructions did not give the definition of actual or express malice but
instead described implied malice." Id. at 352, 283 A.2d at 398. The court of
appeals stated: "IwJithout discussing the issue of whether punitive damages can
be based on implied malice we, nevertheless, disagree with the appellant's
conclusion." Id. Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1947). The facts
showed "there had long been a bitter feeling between defendant and the Alers, by
whom the plaintiff was employed . . . . [l)jefendant had taken a hostile attitude
toward the whole family." Id. at 671, 57 A.2d at 315.
60. Associates Discount Corp. v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 278 A.2d 592 (1971). This case
presented an action for trespass q.c.f. The court of appeals said, "Assuming,
arguendo, that wanton conduct would be equivalent to actual malice and
sufficient for an award of punitive damages, in our opinion, there is no evidence
of wanton conduct on the part of Idefendants] and, also, there is no evidence of
any evil motive or intent on their part." Id. at 582, 278 A.2d at 598.
61. Fowler v. Benton, 245 Md. 540, 226 A.2d 556, cert. denied 389 U.S. 851 (1967).
Plaintiffs brought an action for fraud. The court of appeals stated:
Appellants further contend that the lower court erred in not instructing
the jury on the matter of punitive damages. As we have seen, the record
[Vol. 6210
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punitive damages in any pure action for tort, either actual or implied
malice may be shown.
The most obvious torts that require only that implied malice be
shown for punitive damages are malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment (which includes the tort of false arrest).62 Malice is an
element of a prima facie case for malicious prosecution. 63 The
Maryland courts, however, have long held that in suits for malicious
prosecution, malice may be implied from another element of a prima
facie case, proof of lack of probable cause in making the arrest.64
Thus it has been held that prima facie proof of malicious prosecution
per se supports an award for punitive damages in Maryland. 65 The
legal justification for implying malice sufficient to support punitive
damages from lack of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases
has been extended to cases for false arrest in Maryland. 66 Thus it is
clear that in this state, a plaintiff needs to prove no more than a
prima facie case of malicious prosecution or false arrest in order to
prove the implied malice necessary to support an award for punitive
damages.
More elusive of analysis are cases involving torts of which
prima facie proof does not lend itself to an inference of malice.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals has held that in these cases as
well, proof of implied malice is sufficient to support an award of
punitive damages.
One example is the combined tort of assault and battery. The
leading Maryland case on this point is Vancherie v. Siperly.6 7
Although technically a "red herring" case in which the court was
not forced to consider the issue because the defendant did not object
to the jury instruction in question 68 and because evidence of actual
shows that appellants objected to this omission before the jury retired,
but no grounds for the objection were stated as required by Rule 554 d.
The objection is therefore not properly before us for review.
Id. at 552, 226 A.2d at 564.
The court went on, however, to state that the proper standard for punitive
damages in fraud cases is that given in the dicta, quoted supra note 45, from
Russell v. Stoops, later held to be the law in Wedeman. See also Summit Loans v.
Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972), discussed supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 420-21, 298 A.2d 16, 24-
25 (1972).
63. The other elements are: "(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by
defendant against plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the
accused, [and] (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding." Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173, 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1955).
64. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. at 448, 340 A.2d at 709; Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. at 175, 122 A.2d at 461; Kennedy v. Crouch, 191
Md. 580, 587, 62 A.2d 582, 586 (1948); Derby v. Jenkins, 32 Md. App. at 394, 363
A.2d at 973.
65. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1955); Derby v.
Jenkins, 32 Md. App. 386, 363 A.2d 967 (1976).
66. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. at 421, 298 A.2d at 25.
67. 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966).
68. Id. at 373, 221 A.2d at 360.
1977] 211
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malice was given,69 the court nevertheless considered the standard of
proof necessary to support a punitive damages award:
The argument that there were no grounds for an award of
exemplary damages because, as the defendant put it, 'malice
is a necessary element in inflicting exemplary damages and
no malice was shown in the instant case' overlooks the fact
that a finding by the jury that the injury had been wantonly
inflicted would also justify the award of exemplary
damages.70
This dicta of the court in Vancherie v. Siperly suggests that
proof of implied malice is sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages in a case of assault and battery. It has been repeatedly
cited in later decisions as stating the law on this point in
Maryland. 71
Negligence is another tort for which no proof of malice is
necessary to make out a prima facie case. In Smith v. Gray Concrete
Co., 7 2 the court of appeals applied the implied malice standard to
award punitive damages in a pure negligence action. The case is
singular in Maryland in its recognition that negligence may prove a
basis for punitive damages, and its precedential value must be
carefully regarded in view of the court's reluctance to award punitive
damages in such cases.73 With this caveat in mind, it is no surprise
that the Testerman opinion treated Smith as an anomaly in
Maryland law, 7 4 noting that "that particular holding. . . is carefully
circumscribed in two important respects. It is confined to a wanton
or reckless disregard for human life, and to the operation of a motor
vehicle." 75
Even while confining the Smith decision to the facts of that
case, however, the court of appeals in Testerman specifically stated
that it was not "attempting to delineate [t]here the circumstances
under which the legal equivalent of actual malice may support the
recovery of punitive damages [in negligence cases generally]. '76 The
question remains open as to how far Smith might be applied in
future negligence cases. Nevertheless, that opinion makes clear that
even in cases of negligence where punitive damages are found to be
appropriate, the implied malice standard will apply in Maryland.
More recently, in GAI Audio of N. Y., Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.7 7 the court of special appeals recognized
69. Id. at 374, 221 A.2d at 360.
70. Id. at 373-74, 221 A.2d at 360.
71. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. at 176, 352 A.2d at 817; Montgomery
Ward &. Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. at 420, 298 A.2d at 24.
72. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972):
73. See, e.g., Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. at 70-71, 257 A.2d at 197-98.
74. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 46, 338 A.2d at 54.
77. 27 Md. App. 172, 340 A.2d 71-36 (1975).
212 [Vol. 6
Punitive Damages
for the first time in Maryland the right of a plaintiff to an award of
punitive damages for the tort of unfair competition,78 and applied
the implied malice standard in upholding such an award. GAI Audio
involved a complicated set of facts showing piracy of musical
recordings, but there was "no evidence of hate or rancorous
motive. ' 79 Nevertheless, the court allowed the judgment of punitive
damages to stand:
We are, however, confronted with a course of misconduct
constituting unfair competition through the device of
misappropriation. On the record before us, there can be no
doubt that these acts of unfair competition were practiced
intentionally, wantonly and without legal justification or
excuse. This is implied malice or the "legal equivalent" of
actual malice..80
[T~he situation is clearly one for the effectuation of the
salutory purpose of exemplary damages not merely to
enhance compensatory damages but to penalize the tort-
feasors and to deter others because of the wanton, wilfull
and oppressive character of the acts complained of.8 1
The combined effort of these decisions is to compel the
conclusion that Wedeman, while presenting a case of first
impression in the sense that the court had never before directly
considered punitive damages in a fraud context, nevertheless had a
predictable outcome in the sense that it merely presented the court
with another demand for punitive damages in a pure action for tort.
The implied malice standard of Wedeman is recognized in Maryland
as the standard applicable to all pure actions for tort.8 2
IV. WHEN DOES A TORT ARISE OUT OF A CONTRACT?
Whether the actual malice standard of Testerman or the implied
malice standard of Wedeman applies to a given case depends on
whether the tort sued on is deemed to "arise out of a contract." The
court of appeals has given some guidance to the resolution of this
issue by identifying certain past decisions that it considered to
exemplify torts arising out of contracts 83 and by concluding that
78. Id. at 201-03, 340 A.2d at 753-54.
79. Id. at 204, 340 A.2d at 755.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 205, 340 A.2d at 755.
82. But see note 55 supra.
83. Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Daugherty v.
Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v.
Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied 404 U.S. 857
(1971); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
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"[t]hose cases . . .had in common one salient fact: the contractual
relationship preexisted the tortious conduct. '8 4
The seminal Maryland case on torts arising out of contracts is
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co.8 5 In Knickerbocker, the
defendant ice manufacturer had been selling its ice to the Sumwalt
Company. After Sumwalt contracted to supply ice to the plaintiff,
the defendant refused to continue dealing with Sumwalt unless it
discontinued deliveries to the plaintiff. Sumwalt complied with the
defendant's demands, whereupon the plaintiff instituted suit against
the defendant for interference with contractual relations. The trial
court found for the plaintiff, and awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial
court had erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the
jury. The court held that the tort was "founded on contract"8 6 and
went on to recognize "the right to exemplary damages in [such]
cases."87 The court then considered the standard of malice necessary
to support such an award:
[Tihe difficulty is that there is no evidence of malice in this
case, unless it be such as some of the cases speak of that the
intention to benefit the defendant, or to injure the plaintiff,
is to be treated as evidence of malice. But we have found no
case in which exemplary damages were allowed for malice
implied from such facts.
We do not mean to say there may not be such damages in
cases of this character, for if, for example, there was
evidence tending to show that the defendant had caused the
contract to be broken for the sole purpose and with the
deliberate intention of wrongfully injuring the plaintiff,
exemplary damages might be recovered, but when the object
was merely to benefit itself, although the plaintiff would be
thereby injured, there would be no .... reason for allowing
such damages.88
The tort sued upon in Knickerbocker, interference with contract
rights, presents what is perhaps the clearest example of a tort
arising out of a contract. In such a case, proof of the tort necessitates
proof of the underlying contract. The majority of cases cited in
Testerman as involving torts arising out of contract involve some
84. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. at 529, 336 A.2d at 11.
85. 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
86. Id. at 569, 69 A. at 410.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 569-70, 69 A. at 410. Knickerbocker has been consistently cited as
establishing the rule that actual malice must be proven to support a punitive
damages award in a case for interference with contract rights. E.g., St. Paul at
Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. at 236-37, 278 A.2d at 33.
The court of appeals in Testerman expanded the rule to apply to all tort actions
arising out of contracts. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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variation of the situation found in Knickerbocker.8 9 Cases
subsequent to Knickerbocker, however, expanded its rule to include
other torts arising out of contract. In each case, the contract
preceded the tort and was essential to it, in that the tort would not
have occurred but for the contract. This two-pronged analysis
provides a convenient tool in many cases to ascertain whether the
tort involved arose out of a contract.
The two-pronged analysis is easily applied to Food Fair Stores,
Inc. v. Hevey,90 the companion case to Testerman. There, the tort
alleged was conversion. The property allegedly converted by Food
Fair was money due the plaintiff employees under an agreement
between them and Food Fair entitled "Incentive and Bonus Plan."
Thus, the contract between the employees and Food Fair preceded
any alleged conversion, and but for the contract, the tort never
would have occurred. Since the tort arose out of a contract, the
punitive damages awarded the plaintiff employees had to be
supported by a finding of actual malice.9 1 The record showed that
Food Fair "believed itself legally justified" 92 in withholding the
money because the plaintiffs had violated the anti-competition
clause of the agreement. Citing Testerman and Knickerbocker, the
court applied the actual malice standard 93 and noted that "[a]s the
trial judge clearly recognized, the present case is lacking in any
evidence that would support a finding of actual malice." 94 Food
Fair's good faith in believing itself justified to withhold the money
precluded a finding of the actual malice requisite to a punitive
damages award:
It has long been recognized in Maryland that where an act,
though wrongful in itself, is committed in the honest
assertion of a supposed right or in the discharge of duty, or
without any evil or bad intention, there is no ground on
which punitive damages can be awarded. 95
The most recent case decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals
involving a tort arising out of a contract is Henderson v. Maryland
Nat'l Bank.96 In Henderson, as in Food Fair, the tort alleged was
89. Of the cases cited in Testerman on this point, see note 83 supra, three involved
some form of tortious interference with contract: Daugherty, St. Paul at Chase
Corp., and Damazo.
90. 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975).
91. From the record of the trial, it appeared to the court of appeals that the relief
granted the plaintiff was based on the contract counts of the declaration. The
court noted, however, that "[i]t is clear from [the trial judge's] explanation ...
that he meant to do so under the conversion claims." Id. at 52 n.3, 338 A.2d at 44
n.3.
92. Id. at 56, 338 A.2d at 47.
93. Id. at 54, 338 A.2d at 45.
94. Id. at 55, 338 A.2d at 46.
95. Id. at 56, 338 A.2d at 47.
96. 278 Md. 514, 336 A.2d 1 (1976).
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conversion. The property allegedly converted was the defendant's
automobile on which the bank was a lienholder. The lien had been
extinguished, but due to a mix-up in the bank's files, 97 the plaintiff
continued to receive demands for payment. Finally, the bank
repossessed the car, and then found itself subject to the plaintiff's
lawsuit.
If the above analysis is applied to these facts, 98 it is readily.
apparent that the contract preceded the alleged tort, and but for the
contract between the parties, the tort would never have occurred.
Thus the court properly concluded without any discussion that the
tort sued upon had arisen out of a contractual relationship. 99
Applying Food Fair and Testerman, the court of appeals utilized the
actual malice standard. 10 0 The court of special, appeals, in an
unreported opinion,.10 1 had also applied Testerman, but had found
the evidence of actual malice lacking. 10 2 The court of appeals,
reversed,, concluding "the evidence presented by appellant [Hender-
son] permitted a reasonable and probable inference that the bank
employee was motivated by actual malice in the form of spite or ill
will when he directed the repossession of the automobile."1 0 3
While the two-pronged test employed above should be utilized to
determine whether- the tort arose out of a contract, the two prongs
alone are insufficient to define the essential prerequisites to
applicability of the actual malice standard. A third prong, also
present in the cases discussed above, must be added to make the
analysis complete: the plaintiff must have alternative causes of
action for breach of contract or tort. 10 4
Associates Discount Corp. v. Hillary0 5 reveals the importance of
this third element. 10 6 Associates involved an action against a
97. It was adduced at trial that the bank had a similar account with another
customer named Henderson who was not so prompt as the plaintiff in making
his payments. Id. at 518, 366 A.2d at 3.
98. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
99. 278 Md. at 519, 366 A.2d at 4. There was no need to discuss the issue since the.
parties to the case and the court of special appeals had agreed that the alleged
tort arose out of a contractual relationship. Id.
100. Id. at 519-20, 366 A.2d at 4.
101. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, No. 407, September Term, 1975, decided
March 17, 1976.
102. 278 Md. at 515, 366'A.2d at 2.
103. Id. at 522, 366 A.2d at 6.
104. In cases in which the tort alleged is interference with contract rights, this third
element will not be applicable to the named defendant since the plaintiff's suit
will be against a third party and not against the party with whom he contracted.
See, e.g., Daughtery' v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972). Nevertheless, the
tort action plaintiff could choose to sue the party with whom he contracted for
breach of contract.
105. 262 Md. 570, 278 A.2d 592 (1971).
106. The court of appeals found it unnecessary to answer the question of whether
actual or implied malice would have been sufficient because it found that the
plaintiff had not met either standard. Id. at 582, 278 A.2d at 598. Thus, the case
in effect presents a "red herring." See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra. It
may still be employed, however, for purposes of explanation.
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repossession contractor for trespass. Friends of the plaintiffs, the
Brauns, had purchased an automobile under an installment plan.
When the Brauns were late in their payments, the defendant was
sent to repossess the car. The defendant found the Brauns'
automobile in the plaintiffs' driveway, and in repossessing it, the
defendant first moved the plaintiffs' car. Subsequently, the plaintiffs
brought suit. Thus, a contract preceded the alleged tort, and but for
the contract, the trespass never would have occurred. This author
believes, however, that this case represents a pure tort situation
rather than one involving a tort arising out of a contract. Unlike
cases such as Testerman and Henderson, the plaintiff in Associates
could not have brought suit for breach of contract. In the former
cases, the plaintiffs could have brought, and in fact did bring,
actions for breach of contract.10 7 Both Henderson and Associates
involved installment sales contracts, but the plaintiff in Associates
had no cause of action for a breach of contract. It is this choice of a
contract or tort action which is the third key in determining whether
actual or implied malice must be shown. As the court in Testerman
stated:
[a]lthough the trial court rested the judgment for
compensatory damages on a finding of negligence, the
Testermans had sued alternatively for breach of contract.
Indeed, the trial court left no doubt that had it been denied
any other option, it would have bottomed the award on the
contract theory. The upshot is that the tort committed here
... arose out of a contractual relationship.10 8
Thus the ingredients of the three-pronged test are 1) a contract
preexists the tort; 2) the contract is essential to the tort; and 3) the
plaintiff could sue on alternative theories of tort or contract.
The contract that forms the basis for the tort need not be an
express contract but may be implied, as evidenced by cases
involving torts committed by common carriers against their
passengers. 0 9 A case in point is D.C. Transit System, Inc. v.
Brooks."0 There the plaintiff Brooks sued the D. C. Transit System
for assault and battery, false arrest and malicious prosecution,
stemming from an altercation between Brooks and a transit driver
over whether Brooks had paid the proper fare. The court applied the
actual malice standard, quoting from Judge Henderson's language
in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack"' "that 'where damages beyond
compensation, to punish the party guilty of a wrongful act, are
107. Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. at 515, 366 A.2d at 3; H & R Block v.
Testerman, 275 Md. at 37, 338 A.2d at 49.
108. 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
109. See, e.g., D.C. Transit System v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972);
Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300 (1884).
110. 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972).
111. 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1955).
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asked, the evidence must show wanton or malicious motive, and it
must be actual and not constructive or implied.' "112
The actual malice standard was applied when the contract
involved was that implied in law between a common carrier and its
passenger. 113 Thus, D. C. Transit stands for the proposition that
when the contract is essential to the tort and the plaintiff has
alternative remedies, the other element, that a contract precede the
tort, may be met by an implied contract.
As noted earlier in this article, the standard of malice applied in
pure tort cases appears confused by "red herring" cases. 1 4 "Red
herring" cases have also created confusion with regard to the
question of when a tort arises out of a contract. Two such cases,
McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas 1 5 and Rinaldi v. Tana,"1
were reconciled by the court of appeals with the holding in
Testerman.17 Both McClung and Rinaldi appeared to award
punitive damages on the basis of implied malice only, and yet both
clearly involved torts arising out of contracts.
In McClung, the defendant cross-claimed for conversion and
trover arising out of the alleged wrongful repossession by plaintiff of
a tractor purchased pursuant to an installment sale contract. The
court of appeals affirmed an award of punitive damages and clearly
applied the implied malice standard."" In Testerman, the court
reconciled the McClung case with its later holding by stating:
[A]ctual malice was found in McClung-Logan, where the evil
and spiteful motive was thus described:
'[I]t was a reasonable and proper inference that
appellant became provoked with appellee's numerous
requests that the defective condition of the tractor be
corrected and that it determined to put a stop to the
complaints by seizing the tractor and forcing the appellee to
sign a release of all claims that he might have. The validity
of this inference was clear in the light of appellant's
insistence that appellee release all claims as a condition for
appellant's acceptance of the redemption payment it had
demanded of appellee and which it had stated it would
accept."'19
112. 264 Md. at 584, 287 A.2d at 254.
113. Id. at 585, 287 A.2d at 254. The implied contract was not for the purchase and
sale of a ticket, but for safe passage. Id.
114. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
115. 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961).
116. 262 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1968).
117. 275 Md. at 45, 338 A.2d at 53.
118. 226 Md. at 148-49, 172 A.2d at 501.
119. 275 Md. at 45, 338 A.2d at 53 (quoting McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226
Md. at 149, 172 A.2d at 501).
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Thus, although the McClung court stated it was applying the
implied malice standard, Testerman noted that the case did contain
proof of actual malice.
Similarly, the court reconciled the holding in Rinaldi, a per
curiam opinion involving an interference with contract action, by
quoting from its opinion in Damazo v. Wahby:12°
'[t]here, although the per curiam opinion does not reveal
it, there was testimony in the record that the interferer had
expressed animosity towards his sister with whose contract
he interfered and had threatened and indicated a determined
purpose to harm her. Judge Moore, the trial judge, found this
brought the case within the holding of the Knickerbocker
case'on punitive damages.'121
Thus, the Testerman court concluded that "actual malice was
established in both cases." 122
To the list of "red herring" cases in this area the author adds
Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co. 1 23 Siegman involved an action
brought for conversion of the funds in the plaintiffs' checking
account and the wrongful dishonor of checks. Although the
Testerman court cited Siegman in support of its holding,124 it is clear
that the court in the latter case adopted the implied malice standard:
"To justify an award of punitive damages . . . the Siegmans were
required to show that the conversion and wrongful dishonor of their
check were accompanied by actions which manifest actual malice or
its legal equivalent.' 1 25 It is equally clear that actual malice should
have been required, since the conversion and wrongful dishonor
would never have existed had it not been for the contract between
the Siegmans and the bank, and such contract gave them
alternative tort and contract theories of recovery. Nevertheless, since
no malice at all was shown in the case,126 the court was not forced to
consider whether implied malice alone would support punitive
damages. Although Testerman would overrule McClung, Rinaldi
and Siegman to the extent any of them conflicted with its tenets,
120. 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970).
121. Id. at 639, 270 A.2d at 820.
122. 275 Md. at 45, 338 A.2d at 53.
123. 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972).
124. 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53.
125. 267 Md. at 316, 297 A.2d at 762. The court of appeals recognized the "red herring"
nature of the Siegman opinion in its later opinion in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975), where the court stated:
Although we recognized in Siegman - a tort'case involving conversion
and wrongful dishonor by a bank - that there can be cases in which the
legal equivalent of actual malice might support an award of punitive
damages, we held, in effect, that punitive damages were not recoverable
there under any theory, since malice was totally lacking in either form -
actual or implied.
Id. at 54 n.4, 338 A.2d at 46 n.4.
126. 267 Md. at 316, 297 A.2d at 762.
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each is reconcilable. Such reconciliation is useful because each of
these three cases presents a clear example of a tort arising out of a
contract and each still constitutes Maryland precedent.
In summary, then, the case law both prior to and since
Testerman shows three major elements as prerequisites to a finding
that the tort in question "arose out of a contract": a contract must
exist prior to the occurrence of the tort; it must be so interrelated to
the tort that the tort would not have occurred had the contract not
existed; and the plaintiff must have alternative theories of recovery
in tort and contract under the facts presented. If all of these elements
are shown, the tort "arose out of a contract" and the actual malice
standard espoused in Testerman applies.
V. CONCLUSION
Through its opinions in the Testerman and Wedeman cases, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has fashioned a formula that may be
used to determine what standard of proof of malice will govern
whether punitive damages can be awarded in a given tort case. By
applying the suggested three-pronged analysis1 27 to the facts of a
particular case, a practitioner can determine whether the tort in
question arose out of a contract. This initial characterization
determines in turn whether Testerman or Wedeman applies, and
thus whether proof of actual malice or merely proof of its legal
equivalent will support a punitive damages award.
Some implications of Testerman and Wedeman have yet to be
fully explored and must await further explication by the courts. 28
Nevertheless, it is already apparent that these two decisions have
significantly structured the law governing the recovery of punitive
damages in tort actions in Maryland. The author questions,
however, whether the Maryland law has been soundly structured or
rather merely unnecessarily complicated for the practitioner who
now must engage in these initial technical characterizations on a
case by case basis.
127. See text accompanying notes 83-126 supra.
128. For example, it is not yet entirely clear what factual proof will be necessary to
show either actual malice, see, e.g., Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md.
514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976), or implied malice in a given case. See, e.g., text
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